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THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JOHN ROBERTS: AN ANALYSIS THROUGH THE EYES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
S. Ernie Walton∗
ABSTRACT
This Article is about two things: international law in the United States and
Chief Justice John Roberts’s judicial philosophy. How do the two relate? Quite
nicely, actually. First, Chief Justice Roberts has penned majority opinions in
several landmark cases directly addressing important international law issues.
Second, cases involving international law serve as an excellent window into a
Justice’s judicial philosophy. Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s concluding
paragraph in Medellin v. Texas, a watershed case in which the Court held that
judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are generally not
enforceable in U.S. courts:
In sum, while the ICJ’s judgment in Avena creates an international
law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own
force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions
. . . Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history,
or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or
Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an
international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by many of
our most fundamental constitutional protections.

Federalism, separation of powers, treaty interpretation, U.S. sovereignty—
all issues touched on in just two sentences. Moreover, as international law
expands from governing only relations between States to touching every area
within the jurisdiction of the several states, the status of international law in
the United States has come under increasing scrutiny. No longer is it
uncontroversial to say that international law is part of our law. Indeed, liberal
and conservative Justices routinely split over cases involving international
law.
∗ S. Ernie Walton, Adjunct Faculty Regent University School of Law; Administrative Director, Regent
University School of Law Center for Global Justice, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law. B.S. Houghton
College. J.D. Regent University School of Law. This author thanks Craig Stern for his generous support and
assistance. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and not necessarily shared by those he
thanks or the Center for Global Justice.
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Part I of this Article will provide an overview of five international law
issues in the United States ((1) the presumption against extraterritoriality; (2)
international human rights litigation in U.S. federal courts; (3) the doctrine of
self-executing treaties; (4) the scope of the treaty power; and (5) customary
international law as federal common law) and then provide an update on the
current status of these issues under Chief Justice Roberts. Part II draws
conclusions about Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy based on the
cases discussed and ultimately concludes that the Chief Justice is a
prudentialist, a judge who holds fast to “the conviction that federal judges
must cultivate the virtues of modesty and humility, staying true to their
constitutional duty to interpret the law while fending off whenever possible the
temptation to intrude upon the proper provinces of other public and private
institutions.”
INTRODUCTION
This Article is about two things: international law in the United States
(U.S.) and Chief Justice John Roberts’s judicial philosophy. How do the two
relate? Quite nicely, actually. First, Chief Justice Roberts has penned majority
opinions in several landmark cases directly addressing important international
law issues. Second, cases involving international law serve as an excellent
window into a Justice’s judicial philosophy. Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s
concluding paragraph in Medellín v. Texas, a watershed case in which the
Court held that judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are
generally not enforceable in U.S. courts:
In sum, while the ICJ’s judgment in Avena creates an international
law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own
force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state
restrictions . . . Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and
drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the
judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that
enjoyed by many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.1

Federalism, separation of powers, treaty interpretation, U.S. sovereignty—
all issues touched on in just two sentences. Moreover, as international law
expands from governing only relations between States2 to touching every area
1

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“International law
governs relations between independent States.”).
2
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within the jurisdiction of the “several states,”3 the status of international law in
the United States has come under increasing scrutiny. No longer is it
uncontroversial to say that “[i]nternational law is part of our law.”4 Indeed,
liberal and conservative Justices routinely split over cases involving
international law.5
Part I of this Article will provide an overview of five international law
issues in the United States and then provide an update on the current status of
these issues under Chief Justice Roberts. Part II draws conclusions about Chief
Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy based on the cases discussed. Before
turning to the issues themselves, however, a word is in order about how others
have characterized Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy.
In 2007, shortly after Roberts’s confirmation, one commentator published
an article arguing that Chief Justice Roberts was a prudentialist.6 In short, a
prudentialist judge is one who holds fast to “the conviction that federal judges
must cultivate the virtues of modesty and humility, staying true to their
constitutional duty to interpret the law while fending off whenever possible the
temptation to intrude upon the proper provinces of other public and private
institutions.”7 In a similar vein, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez,
one of the people tasked by President George W. Bush to identify Supreme
Court nominees, described Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy as
comprising four principles: judicial avoidance, judicial deference, narrow
construction, and clarity.8 Part II will test whether these characterizations are
accurate.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE ROBERTS COURT
Although international law touches the U.S. legal system in a myriad of
ways, only five will be discussed in this Article: (1) the presumption that U.S.
statutes do not have extraterritorial effect; (2) international human rights
3 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 399, 400 (2000).
4 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423, 3 L. Ed. 769
(1815) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land.”).
5 See infra Part I.
6 Daniel Breen, Avoiding “Wild Blue Yonders”: The Prudentialism of Henry J. Friendly and John
Roberts, 52 S.D. L. REV. 73, 89, 127–31 (2007).
7 Id. at 76.
8 Alberto R. Gonzales, In Search of Justice: An Examination of the Appointments of John G. Roberts
and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court and Their Impact on American Jurisprudence, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 693–94 (2014).
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litigation in U.S. federal courts; (3) the doctrine of self-executing treaties; (4)
the scope of the treaty power; and (5) customary international law as federal
common law. In the last six years alone, Chief Justice Roberts wrote majority
opinions in landmark cases directly addressing the first four issues.9 The fifth
issue, customary international law as part of federal common law, was
confronted by the Court in 2004, before the Chief Justice joined the Court, and
indirectly by Chief Justice Roberts in 2013. Each of these issues will be
addressed in turn in this Part.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Nothing in the Constitution limits Congress from passing legislation
regulating conduct outside of U.S. territory.10 In light of political concerns and
jurisdictional limits imposed by international law, however, the question is
whether Congress actually intends such a result. In a system run by sovereign
and equal states, each state, generally, only has jurisdiction to regulate matters
within its own geographical territory. This is the central premise behind the
“presumption against extraterritoriality.”11 “It is a longstanding principle of
American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”12
Considered a canon of statutory construction, the presumption against
extraterritorial application has been a key component in the Court’s
jurisprudence since the early nineteenth century.13 Over the years, the
9 Other international law issues directly addressed by Chief Justice Roberts include the rights of the
Guantanamo Bay detainees, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 802–03 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should not have addressed the question of whether the detainees had a constitutional
right to habeas corpus because “the system the political branches constructed adequately protects any
constitutional rights aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants may enjoy”), and the scope of
the foreign affairs powers, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the power to recognize foreign sovereigns is not exclusive to the Executive but
is shared with Congress, and, even if it were exclusive, the issue was moot because the case did not implicate
the recognition power). Chief Justice Roberts also joined the majority opinion in Samantar v. Yousuf, a
unanimous judgment that held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply to individuals.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010).
10 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
11 In addition to the presumption against extraterritoriality, a related canon of statutory interpretation is
known as the Charming Betsy presumption. Under this presumption, “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804).
12 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949)).
13 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 85, 85 (1998).
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Supreme Court has offered several rationales for the presumption, including:
(1) “protect[ing] against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord”;14 (2) that “Congress
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters”;15 and (3)
“that the determination of whether and how to apply federal legislation to
conduct abroad raises difficult and sensitive policy questions that tend to fall
outside both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of the
judiciary” (i.e., separation of powers concerns).16 Thus, the presumption
operates as a nice backdrop against which Congress can legislate, assuming, of
course, that the Court’s use and application of the presumption is itself clear
and predictable.
After gaining traction in the early twentieth century,17 the presumption
“began to wane.”18 Indeed, the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law
(1987) even went so far as to declare that the presumption, though often quoted
by the courts, “does not reflect the current law of the United States.”19 The
status of the presumption against extraterritoriality took a dramatic turn in
1991. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco), the Court considered whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 applied extraterritorially.20 In analyzing this question, Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed the presumption against extraterritoriality as requiring
Congress to “make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas.”21 Finding
no such clear statement in the text of the statute, and rejecting the use of
legislative history and administrative interpretations, the majority concluded
that Title VII did not have extraterritorial effect.22

14

Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
16 Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
505, 516 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Other commentators have suggested up to six potential rationales
for the presumption. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 13, at 90 (finding six potential rationales in the Court’s
jurisprudence and among scholars, but arguing that the only legitimate rationale for the presumption’s
continued application is that Congress generally legislates with respect to domestic concerns).
17 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
18 Dodge, supra note 13, at 85.
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415 n.2 (1987) (citing United States v. Sisal
Sale Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)).
20 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
21 Id. at 258; see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991) (citing
Aramco as requiring a “plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect”).
22 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
15
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Accordingly, Aramco ushered in a new era for the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Following Aramco, however, the Court indicated that
perhaps it overstated the strength of the presumption with respect to the clear
statement requirement. For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, the majority opinion did not even mention the presumption when
analyzing the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.23 This decision,
coupled with other inconsistent decisions applying the presumption,24 left
much ambiguity in the lower courts with respect to what the presumption
actually meant and required.25
Since joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has confronted several cases
in which the presumption against extraterritoriality played a key role in the
Court’s decision.26 Two are worth mentioning. The first, Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., addressed “whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and
American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on
foreign exchanges.”27 Morrison involved a suit by foreign shareholders against
a foreign company, National Australia Bank, alleging that the bank engaged in
fraudulent activity involving one if its subsidiaries.28 In an opinion written by
Justice Scalia (in which Chief Justice Roberts joined), the majority held that
§ 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially, finding “no affirmative indication” in
the Securities Exchange Act that it was meant to have such effect.29
In ruling against extraterritorial application of § 10(b), the Court made
several important statements regarding the presumption. First, the Court noted

23 See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). In his dissent, Justice Scalia
discussed the presumption but noted that “it is now well established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially.” Id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388–89, 394 (2005) (relying on the presumption,
despite noting it did not apply, to find that the phrase in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), “convicted in any court,”
encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions); see also id. at 401 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
Court’s creation [of a new statutory canon based on the presumption] threatens to wreak havoc with the
established rules for applying the canon against extraterritoriality.”).
25 See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 390–96
(2010) (outlining the confusion and different interpretations in lower courts with respect to the presumption
against extraterritoriality).
26 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (the presumption against
extraterritoriality reflects the understanding “that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world”).
27 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250–51 (2010).
28 Id. at 250–52.
29 Id. at 265.
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that the presumption should be applied “in all cases.”30 In this vein, the Court
chastised the Second Circuit for disregarding the presumption31 and for
engaging in “judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what Congress would
have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court.”32 Accordingly,
any time a petitioner seeks to establish extraterritorial effect of a U.S. statute,
the presumption must be applied. Second, the Court articulated a new standard
for the presumption: “When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”33 The Court explained that its “clear
indication” standard did not require Congress to actually state, “this law
applies abroad.”34 On the contrary, “context can be consulted as well.”35
Accordingly, the Court explicitly disavowed interpreting Aramco’s “clear
statement rule” as requiring an explicit statement in the text of the statute, but
reaffirmed Aramco’s central holding that the presumption was a high threshold
to overcome and only a clear indication from Congress would be sufficient to
rebut it.
In the second case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court reaffirmed
Morrison’s framing of the presumption as requiring a “clear indication” of
congressional intent.36 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority. In Kiobel,
a group of Nigerians residing in the United States sued several foreign oil
companies, claiming that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in committing violations of the “law of nations” in Nigeria.37 The
Plaintiffs filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).38 Importantly, the
Court acknowledged that although the ATS is “only jurisdictional,” the
presumption against extraterritoriality should nonetheless apply to the statute.39
The Court then held that nothing in the text or history of the ATS evinced a
“clear indication” that the ATS was intended to apply abroad.40
Kiobel is significant with respect to the presumption against
extraterritoriality for several reasons. First, the Court reaffirmed Morrison’s

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 261.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
Id. at 1662. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra Part I.B.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988); infra Part I.B.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 (2010)).
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central holding that the presumption requires a “clear indication” of
Congressional intent for a statute to apply extraterritorially.41 Second, the
Court extended the application of the presumption from statutes purporting to
regulate conduct abroad to the ATS, a statute that is “strictly jurisdictional.”42
The Court found that one of the primary justifications for the canon—deferring
to the “political branches” on matters implicating foreign policy—was
particularly acute with respect to the ATS.43 Indeed, claims under the ATS
must involve aliens and the law of nations,44 and, like in Kiobel, often involve
the deliberate acts of foreign governments against their own citizens, thereby
forcing U.S. courts to sit in judgment on the actions of foreign sovereigns.45
Accordingly, the Court held in Kiobel that “[t]he principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their
power under the ATS.”46 Third, Chief Justice Roberts, in the last paragraph of
his opinion, limited the effect of the presumption with respect to suits brought
under the ATS. Noting that all the relevant conduct took place abroad, the
Court found that the plaintiffs could not overcome that presumption.47
However, Chief Justice Roberts held that “even where the claims [under the
ATS] touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”48 While Chief Justice Roberts’s statement opens a host of
questions about the meaning and application of the presumption,49 foremost of
which is whether the presumption applies to conduct or effects, or both,50 it is
significant for the status of the presumption—at least with respect to suits
41

Id. at 1664.
Id. But see William S. Dodge, Dodge—The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to
Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-postdodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/ (“My point is simply that the Supreme
Court in Kiobel, consistent with its prior cases, did not apply the presumption to the ATS as a jurisdictional
statute but rather to the substantive cause of action that Sosa had recognized.”).
43 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
45 E.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving a claim by citizens of
Paraguay against another citizen of Paraguay, who, at the time of the conduct in dispute, was the Inspector
General of Police, for torture taking place in Paraguay).
46 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
47 Id. at 1669.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50 Dodge, supra note 13, at 88–89 (finding that the presumption against “extraterritorial” application
could mean that acts of Congress apply to (1) conduct that occurs in the United States, (2) conduct that causes
effects in the United States, regardless of where the conduct actually occurs, or (3) both conduct occurring in
the United States and conduct causing effects of the United States, unless a contrary intent appears).
50 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
42
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brought under the ATS—because it may permit lower courts to balance the
strength of the connection of the claim to the United States against the
presumption that the ATS only applies domestically.51
What can we glean from these cases with respect to the presumption
against extraterritorial application? First, the presumption is here to stay.
Despite the outcry of some scholars that the presumption should be
jettisoned,52 Chief Justice Roberts has firmly embedded the presumption into
the Court’s jurisprudence. Second, the Chief Justice has helped give the
presumption teeth. Defining the presumption as requiring a “clear indication”
from Congress and holding that it applies in all cases—including to statutes
that are only jurisdictional—significantly contrasts with Justice Marshall’s
view of the presumption.53 Finally, the Chief Justice’s characterization of the
presumption reinforces separation of powers and the narrow role of the
judiciary in foreign affairs. By strengthening the presumption and adopting a
clear background rule against which Congress can legislate, Chief Justice
Roberts ensured that the President and Congress—not the judiciary—will be
the branches that decide whether U.S. statutes apply abroad.
B. International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts
In terms of international law, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Kiobel is
important for another, and perhaps more important, reason than just the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Kiobel severely, although not
completely,54 curtailed the use of the U.S. federal courts as a forum for
litigating international human rights cases.55 Long the goal of some human
rights activists, opening U.S. courts to foreign plaintiffs in human rights cases
51
52

See infra Part I.B.
E.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1

(2014).
53

Aramco, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
55 Id. at 1668. For purposes of this Article, “international human rights cases” primarily refers to cases
that are (1) brought by foreign plaintiffs, (2) against foreign defendants, whether individuals, corporations, or
governments, (3) for violations of international law (4) that occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Most Americans would probably be
surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent BosnianSerb forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan. Their claims seek to build upon the foundation of
this Court’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which recognized the important
principle that the venerable Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), enacted in 1789 but rarely invoked since
then, validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against
aliens in violation of the law of nations.”).
54
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has been controversial since the movement started.56 One of the primary
reasons for the controversy is separation of powers concerns.57
The birth of the movement can be traced to Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, decided
by the Second Circuit in 1980.58 Filártiga summed up the movement’s goal
well: “Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by
our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”59 The argument for
using U.S. federal courts as a forum for litigating international human rights
cases goes something like this. Governments all over the world commit severe
human rights abuses every day. Despite human rights treaties and domestic
constitutions guaranteeing various rights and redress against such abuses,
victims, for numerous reasons,60 are often unable to obtain access to justice—
whether in their home country or before an international tribunal. Accordingly,
the United States—a nation committed to human rights and the rule of law—
should open its courts to those who cannot otherwise obtain justice, regardless
of whether the United States has any traditional legal interest in the case.
Indeed, to some human rights advocates, the U.S. interest in protecting human
rights is a sufficient legal basis in and of itself to open our courts to foreign
victims of human rights abuses.61
Filártiga embodies these goals. In Filártiga, two Paraguayan nationals
residing in the United States filed suit against the Paraguayan Inspector
General of Police for kidnapping and torturing their family member to death in
Paraguay. Although the Filártigas served the complaint on Peña-Irala in the
United States, all conduct relevant to the complaint occurred in Paraguay.62
Regardless of the injustice committed against Mr. Filártiga, the immediate
question is: on what legal basis could two aliens bring suit in the United States
56

See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Cost of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
457, 458 (2001); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749–50 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a
private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century
invention of internationalist law professors and human rights advocates.”).
57 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746–47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
59 Id. at 890.
60 Corruption, broken justice systems, cultural norms, and lack of knowledge about the legal process all
contribute to the lack of enforcement of basic rights for millions of people throughout the globe.
61 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (“American federal
courts—be they in California or any other state—have a strong interest in adjudicating and redressing
international human rights abuses.”), reh’g granted, vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010).
62 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
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against another alien representing a foreign government for conduct that
occurred entirely outside the United States?
According to the Second Circuit, the ATS provided the answer.63 Passed in
1789 by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act, the ATS provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”64 Until Filártiga, the ATS was all but dead letter. Indeed,
the ATS had only been used once in the past 170 years.65 This fact was of little
importance to the Second Circuit, which held that the ATS was a proper
medium to enter through the sacred gate of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.66 According to the court, the ATS was constitutional under Article
III because it involved the law of nations, “which has always been part of the
federal common law.”67 And because the prohibition on torture had allegedly
attained the status of customary international law, the suit was proper.68
Importantly, the Second Circuit placed no territorial limits on the reach of the
ATS.

63 Since Filártiga was decided, the U.S. Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1991). The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), in addition to the ATS, is the other primary statute
by which foreign plaintiffs litigate international human rights cases in U.S. federal courts. The TVPA was
passed to “carry out obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and other international
agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages
from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” Id. Under the TVPA, any individual,
including aliens, may sue an “individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation,” subjects the individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. Id. § 1350(2)(a). Accordingly, the
TVPA expresses Congress’s clear intent to permit aliens to sue individuals acting in a governmental capacity
for torture even when the torture occurs outside the United States. In the only Supreme Court case addressing
the TVPA, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the Roberts Court unanimously ruled that the TVPA applies
exclusively to natural persons and does not impose liability against any organizational entity. Mohamad v.
Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710–11 (2012).
64 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015). The ATS is also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act.
65 The ATS provided the basis for jurisdiction over a child custody suit between two aliens in Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). Until Adra, the ATS had not been invoked since 1795. Bolchos v.
Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (finding that the ATS provided an alternative basis of jurisdiction over a
suit to determine title to slaves on board an enemy vessel taken on the high seas).
66 See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
67 Id. at 885. The Second Circuit did not even mention Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938), which famously held that “[t]here is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.” For a further discussion of international law as federal common law, see infra Part
I.E.
68 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
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The doors were now wide open. Aliens could come to the United States
and sue their own governments under the ATS for violations of international
law, regardless of whether the complaint indicated any connection to the
United States.69 Over the next thirty years, some 173 cases were brought, at
least in part, under the ATS in U.S. federal courts.70
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to address the scope of the ATS
until 2004, before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court. In Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,71 the Court held that the ATS provided jurisdiction over violations of
international law that possessed the same “definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations” as the “historical paradigms”—violations of safe
conduct, offenses against ambassadors, and piracy—familiar to the Founders.72
Although the Court purported to limit the scope of the ATS to only clearly
definable norms of international law,73 it, like the Second Circuit in Filártiga,
made no mention of any territorial limits on the ATS. Thus, the U.S. federal
courts continued to remain a legitimate option for foreign plaintiffs suing for
human rights abuses committed outside U.S. territory.74
Nine years later, Chief Justice Roberts had his first (and thus far only)
crack at the ATS. Although the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to

69 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming the judgment under the ATS
against a former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment); Kadic v.
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that alleged war crimes, genocide, torture, and other
atrocities committed by a Bosnian Serb leader were actionable under the ATS); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 162–63 (D. Mass. 1995) (deeming torture, summary execution, “disappearance,” and arbitrary
detention by Guatemalan military to be actionable violations under the ATS).
70 Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System
of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357 (2011) (noting that since 1980, “U.S. courts have issued
173 opinions in cases brought, at least in part, under the ATS”).
71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
72 Id. at 694, 732.
73 See id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In today’s latest victory for its Never Say Never Jurisprudence,
the Court ignores its own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags a finger at the lower courts
for going too far, and then—repeating the same formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used—
invites them to try again.”).
74 E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated sub nom.,
Rio Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (finding jurisdiction under the ATS for claims made by
residents of Papua New Guinea against international mining group for genocide and war crimes occurring
during mining operation in Papua New Guinea); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025
(7th Cir. 2011) (“Sosa was a case of nonmaritime extraterritorial conduct yet no Justice suggested that
therefore it couldn’t be maintained.”); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
jurisdiction under the ATS for claims brought by Nigerian nationals against Pfizer for engaging in nonconsensual medical experimentation in conjunction with the Nigerian government in Nigeria).
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decide the issue of corporate civil tort liability under international law,75 it
subsequently ordered re-argument on the broader question of “[w]hether and
under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.”76 Kiobel involved a suit by a group of
Nigerians that accused three oil companies—which were incorporated in
the Netherlands, Britain, and Nigeria—of violating the law of nations in
Nigeria by aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing
numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and
torture.77
As discussed in Part I.A, Chief Justice Roberts first held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to causes of action brought under
the ATS.78 According to the Chief Justice, applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the ATS served the important purposes of preventing
outright clashes with the political branches and “impinging” on their discretion
in matters of foreign affairs.79 Second, the Chief Justice held that nothing in the
text, history, or purposes of the ATS rebutted the presumption.80 Indeed, “there
is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”81 Applying the
law to the facts, the Court held that “all the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory
of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”82 “Mere corporate presence,”
according to Chief Justice Roberts, was not sufficient to displace the
presumption.83

75

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
Order Granting Re-argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2012) (No. 10-1491),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.
77 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. For more detail about the Ogoni people and the abuses they suffered,
see Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and People’s Rights, Comm. No.
155/96 (2001), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html.
78 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1660.
79 Id. at 1664–65.
80 Id. at 1665–69.
81 Id. at 1668.
82 Id. at 1669.
83 Id. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote a separate opinion.
Unlike the Chief Justice, Justice Breyer interpreted the ATS as authorizing suits in the United States based on
principles of international law governing the prescriptive jurisdiction of states. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
76
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How does Kiobel affect the status of international human rights litigation in
the U.S. federal courts? First, the days of traditional Filártiga-style litigation
are over, at least for suits brought under the ATS.84 No longer will a foreign
plaintiff be able to bring suit in U.S. federal courts when the claim bears no
connection to the United States.85 This is significant because many of the cases
that were successfully brought under the ATS post-Filártiga were exactly this
type of case.86 Second, despite the clear limiting effect of Kiobel, the
implications of the Court’s holding are yet to be determined.87 The ambiguity
lies in Chief Justice Roberts’s statement, “[a]nd even where the claims touch
and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”88 On one
hand, this phrase could be interpreted to strengthen the effect of the
presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to suits brought under the
ATS. Chief Justice Roberts could be stating that any connection to the United
States—like mere corporate presence or the status of a defendant as a U.S.
national—is not sufficient to overcome the presumption. Only when the crux
of the case—the actual violation of the law of nations that is the subject of the

84 For claims of torture, aliens can bring a civil suit against another “individual” acting in a governmental
capacity even when the relevant conduct takes place entirely outside the United States. See supra note 63.
85 Beyond Kiobel, the Roberts Court issued an 8-1 opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman written by Justice
Ginsburg that created another hurdle to litigating international human rights cases in the United States.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Daimler AG involved a suit under the ATS brought by
Argentine nationals against a German corporation for allegedly collaborating with the Argentine government
to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill” plaintiffs and their families during Argentina’s “Dirty War” of the late
1970s and early 1980s. Id. at 748. The Court held that Daimler’s contacts with California were insufficient to
subject the corporate defendant to general personal jurisdiction in California because a corporation’s
“affiliations with the State [must be] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the
forum State.” Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011)). Daimler’s contacts with California did not meet this high standard. The Court further noted that the
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the ATS and TVPA to support general jurisdiction was erroneous in light of Kiobel
and Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). Id. at 762–63.
86 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (Ethiopian national sued former
Ethiopian official for torture occurring in Ethiopia); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Bosnian
nationals sued the President of the Bosnian–Serb republic of “Srpska” for genocide and other atrocities
committed in Bosnia).
87 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). Kiobel also left open the issue of whether
corporations possess liability under international law. Several courts have already addressed the issue post
Kiobel. E.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “corporations can
face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute” and noting that the Supreme Court in Kiobel
“suggest[ed] in dicta that corporations may be liable under [the] ATS so long as [the] presumption against
extraterritorial application is overcome”); In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 15 F. Supp. 3d 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding, in defiance of Second Circuit precedent, that corporations are liable under the law
of nations and therefore under the ATS).
88 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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complaint—occurs in U.S. territory can the presumption be overcome. This
view is supported, if not completely confirmed, by Chief Justice Roberts’s
statement that the “petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the law of
nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”89 Moreover, this is
effectively how Justice Alito interpreted “touch and concern” in his concurring
opinion.90 On the other hand, the Chief Justice’s statement could be interpreted
to weaken the effect of the presumption with respect to suits brought under the
ATS. In essence, Chief Justice Roberts could be stating that even if the conduct
that is the subject of the complaint occurred outside U.S. territory, the
presumption could be overcome if the United States is sufficiently implicated
in the suit—as through the nationality of a corporate defendant.91
When exactly claims “touch and concern” the United States with
“sufficient force” will be determined in a later case, as Justice Kennedy noted
in his concurring opinion,92 but only after the lower courts have their say and
influence. Indeed, the circuits are already split on the issue along the lines
outlined above.93 Chief Justice Roberts left the door open, even if ever so
89 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1667 (“These prominent contemporary examples—immediately
before and after passage of the ATS—provide no support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of
action to be brought under the statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad.”).
90 Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring); see also infra note 93.
91 E.g., In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 465 (holding that corporations may be
held liable under the ATS and that, based on Kiobel, “Plaintiffs may move for leave to file an amended
complaint against the remaining American defendants”). But see id. (“In that motion plaintiffs must make a
preliminary showing that they can plausibly plead that those defendants engaged in actions that ‘touch and
concern’ the United States with sufficient force to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial reach
of the ATS . . . .”).
92 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93 Compare Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying claim under the ATS
brought by victims of apartheid against South African subsidiaries of American corporations because, under
Kiobel, “claims under the ATS cannot be brought for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States”), Ben-Haim v. Neeman, 543 F. App’x 152, 155 (3d Cir.
2013) (interpreting Kiobel as holding “that the ATS does not apply when all of the relevant conduct took place
outside the United States”), Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (holding no jurisdiction under the ATS where plaintiffs were Colombian
citizens filing suit against American corporations for alleged acts of torture occurring in Colombia because,
under Kiobel, “the ATS does not apply extraterritorially”), and Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding,
Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 44–45, 47–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (denying ATS claims filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who
allegedly was detained and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi
business partner because Kiobel bars suits under the ATS where all the relevant conduct occurred outside the
United States), with Doe v. Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 586 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, courts have been
left to form their own interpretations as to the meaning and requirements of these standards.”), Mujica v.
Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that Kiobel “did not hold that plaintiffs may never
bring ATS claims based on extraterritorial conduct”), Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516,
520, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding jurisdiction under Kiobel’s “touch and concern standard” where four
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slightly, to use the ATS as a means to litigate some, albeit a narrow class, of
international human rights cases in U.S. federal courts. And with the door
open, it is certain that some “ambitious lower courts”94 will take the
opportunity to continue to use the U.S. federal courts as fora for litigating these
cases and expressing their views on the law of nations.95 In any event, despite
the ambiguity, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Kiobel demonstrates his
commitment to separation of powers and the primacy of the political branches
over U.S. foreign affairs. Under Kiobel, Congress, not the courts, will
determine whether U.S. courts should be open to foreign plaintiffs to litigate
Filártiga-style cases.96
C. Self-Executing Treaties
Since the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between treaties that have automatic domestic legal effect and those that
require implementing legislation from Congress. This is known as the doctrine
of self-executing treaties. A treaty is “equivalent to an act of the legislature,”
i.e., self-executing, when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision.”97 On the other hand, a treaty is not self-executing when it requires
Congress to pass legislation giving it effect.98 Thus, treaties do not constitute
binding domestic law enforceable by U.S. courts “unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”99
Iraqis sued a U.S. corporation for alleged torture committed in Iraq during the Iraq war because several factors
gave the claim sufficient connection to the United States), Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2013) (finding that an ATS claim involving a terrorist attack against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi did “touch
and concern” the United States with sufficient force to overcome the presumption even though the plaintiffs
were all Kenyans, the defendants were all aliens, and the relevant conduct occurred in Kenya), and Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309–11 (D. Mass. 2013) (allowing suit under the ATS
against an American Pastor who “attempted to foment, and to a substantial degree has succeeding [sic] in
fomenting, an atmosphere of harsh and frightening repression against LGBTI people in Uganda” because
“Kiobel makes clear that its restrictions on extraterritorial application of American law do not apply where a
defendant and his or her conduct are based in this country”).
94 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
95 E.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520, 530–31 (finding jurisdiction under the ATS for a claim brought by
Iraqi nationals against U.S. corporations for alleged torture occurring only in Iraq because of the connection of
the claim to the United States).
96 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
97 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
98 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
99 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d
145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.)).
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Like the presumption against extraterritoriality and opening our courts to
foreign plaintiffs to litigate international human rights cases, whether a treaty
is self-executing has significant implications for separation of powers.100
Under the scheme adopted by the Founders, the Constitution divides the treaty
power between the President, who has the power to “make” treaties, and the
Senate, which must provide “advice and consent” by a two-thirds vote.101 The
judiciary, then, is generally excluded from having a role in making, and even
enforcing, treaties.102 This makes perfect sense when treaties are viewed as
commitments between sovereign nations that are enforced primarily “on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.”103 Indeed,
“[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it ‘addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.’”104
So when is a treaty self-executing? Is there a presumption that a treaty is
not self-executing?105 Does the treaty’s text have to make clear that the treaty
is self-executing? These issues were addressed by Chief Justice Roberts in
Medellín v. Texas.106 To understand Medellín, it is necessary first to examine
the history leading up to it. Medellín is the culmination of a long battle
between Mexico and the United States over the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), which
obligates all authorities who detain a foreign national to “inform the person
concerned without delay of his right[]” to communicate with his consulate,
among other things.107 Medellín is also the final round in a long—and more
100 Beyond separation of powers concerns, whether a treaty is self-executing also has huge implications
for federalism. This concern, however, is better addressed in the context of the scope of the treaty power under
the Constitution. This issue will be addressed in the next section, Part I.D.
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
102 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 516 (“The dissent’s contrary approach would assign to the courts—not the
political branches—the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be enforced. To
read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes does not is tantamount to
vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law.”); Bradley and Goldsmith,
supra note 3, at 441–42.
103 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
104 Id. at 516 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.). at 314).
105 Compare id. at 505, with id. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he text and history of the Supremacy
Clause, as well as this Court’s treaty-related cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution.”), and
id. at 546 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But the case law does make clear that, insofar as today’s majority looks for
language about ‘“self-execution’ in the treaty itself and insofar as it erects ‘clear statement’ presumptions
designed to help find an answer, it is misguided.”).
106 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–06, 514, 519, 525–27.
107 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force
Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter VCCR].
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significant—battle between the U.S. Supreme Court and the ICJ. In 2004, in a
case (Avena) brought by Mexico against the United States pursuant to the
Optional Protocol to the VCCR,108 the ICJ held that fifty-one Mexican
nationals were entitled to “review and reconsideration” of their state-court
convictions and sentences in the United States because of violations of Article
36 of the VCCR.109 Importantly, the ICJ also held that allowing Texas to apply
its state procedural default rules to Article 36 violations “would have the effect
of preventing ‘full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this article are intended,’ and thus violate paragraph 2 of
Article 36.”110 Thus, according to the ICJ, Texas and other states’ use and
application of their own rules of criminal procedure placed the United States in
breach of its treaty obligations under the VCCR.
After Avena, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Chief Justice Roberts held—in
direct contrast to Avena—that a state may apply its regular procedural default
rules to claims under the VCCR.111 In rejecting the petitioner’s argument that
the Supreme Court should follow the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR in
Avena, Chief Justice Roberts affirmatively rejected the notion that the Supreme
Court was bound by the ICJ’s decisions:
Although the ICJ’s interpretation deserves “respectful consideration,”
we conclude that it does not compel us to reconsider our
understanding of the Convention in Breard.112 Under our

108 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
109 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 153
(Mar. 31); see also LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 91 (June 27) (holding that where a
defendant was not notified of his rights under Article 36, application of the procedural default rule failed to
give “full effect” to the purposes of Article 36 because it prevented courts from attaching “legal significance”
to the Article 36 violation).
110 Mex. v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 113 (quoting VCCR, supra note 107, art. 36(2)).
111 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006).
112 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), was the beginning of the battle between the ICJ and the U.S.
Supreme Court over the interpretation and application of the VCCR. Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was
convicted of rape and murder and set to be executed by the state of Virginia. Id. at 372–73. After failing to
gain ground in the U.S. courts, Paraguay brought suit against the United States before the ICJ, claiming the
United States violated the VCCR for failing to inform Breard of his rights under the VCCR at the time of his
arrest. Id. at 374. The ICJ issued an interim order instructing the United States to “take all measures at its
disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings . . . .” Id. “Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay application
in [the Supreme] Court in order to ‘enforce’ the ICJ’s order,” claiming that the VCCR was “the ‘supreme law
of the land’ and thus trump[ed] the procedural default doctrine.” Id. at 374–75. In direct contrast to the ICJ’s
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Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” is “vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.” That “judicial Power . . .
extend[s] to . . . Treaties” . . . [and includes] the duty “to say what the
law is.” If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal
system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law “is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,”
headed by the “one supreme Court” established by the
Constitution.113

Further complicating the matter, President Bush issued a memorandum
post-Avena to the states declaring that the United States would “discharge its
international obligations” under Avena “by having State courts give effect to
the decision.”114 The President’s memorandum, coupled with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas, set the stage for another round between
the ICJ and the U.S. Supreme Court. Based on the President’s memorandum,
Medellín, who was one of the fifty-one named Mexican nationals and
convicted of murder in a Texas state court, filed a second application for writ
of habeas corpus.115 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed
Medellín’s application as an abuse of the writ under state law.116 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari to address whether Avena was “directly
enforceable as domestic law in a state court in the United States” and whether
the President’s memorandum obligated the states to carry out the ICJ’s
decision.117
Medellín v. Texas was the forum for the final showdown. In analyzing
whether the ICJ’s judgment constituted a “binding” obligation on U.S. federal
and state courts, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the question turned on
whether specific provisions of the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, the United
Nations (U.N.) Charter, or the ICJ Statute were self-executing.118 Finding that
the Optional Protocol was nothing more than a “bare grant of jurisdiction,” the

interim order, the Supreme Court held that Breard’s VCCR claim was subject to procedural default and
therefore he could not raise the issue on habeas corpus review. Id. at 374–76.
113 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54 (internal citations omitted).
114 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 504.
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Chief Justice turned to the U.N. Charter.119 Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
provides that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.”120 He held that the
phrase, “undertakes to comply,” was clearly not a “directive to domestic
courts” but rather simply a “‘call upon governments to take certain action.’”121
In other words, Article 94 was not self-executing because it addressed itself to
the political branches and not the courts. Chief Justice Roberts found
additional support for his reasoning in the enforcement structure for the ICJ’s
decisions.122 Under Article 94(2), the sole remedy for failure to comply with an
ICJ decision is referral to the U.N. Security Council, which is an expressly
diplomatic and non-judicial remedy.123
The Chief Justice also responded to the dissent’s criticism that the
majority’s opinion focused solely on the text of the relevant treaties in deciding
whether a treaty was self-executing.124 First, responding to Justice Breyer,125
Chief Justice Roberts “confess[ed]” that he did believe it important to answer
the question whether a treaty is self-executing based on the text of the treaty.126
Indeed, the determination regarding self-execution must be decided based on
the text because the text is what the Senate reviews when deciding whether to
ratify a treaty. Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the dissent’s
“multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis” was hardly what the Founders
could have envisioned.127 On the contrary, the Framers’ careful division of the
treaty power between the President and Senate indicated that in no way did

119 The Optional Protocol provides: “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
[Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”
Optional Protocol, supra note 108, art. 1.
120 U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
121 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508 (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976))); see also id. at 534
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Absent a presumption one way or the other, the best reading of the words
‘undertakes to comply’ is, in my judgment, one that contemplates future action by the political branches.”).
122 Id. at 509–11 (majority opinion).
123 U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 2.
124 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514.
125 Id. at 514; see also id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he absence or presence of language in a
treaty about a provision’s self-execution proves nothing at all.”); id. at 552 (“True, neither the Protocol nor the
Charter explicitly states that the obligation to comply with an ICJ judgment automatically binds a party as a
matter of domestic law without further domestic legislation. But how could the language of those documents
do otherwise?”).
126 Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
127 Id. at 514–15.

WALTON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS

2/15/2016 9:41 AM

411

they intend to vest the judiciary the power to decide whether a treaty provision
was self-executing without looking to the treaty language.128
Chief Justice Roberts concluded: “Nothing in the text, background,
negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests
that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the
judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by
‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’”129 Roberts then
addressed the second issue—the constitutionality of the President’s
memorandum—and held that the President’s memorandum did not bind the
states because it was an unconstitutional attempt to “make law,” a function
reserved to Congress alone under Article I,130 and was not within the bounds of
the President’s foreign affairs authority.131
What are the implications of the Chief Justice’s opinions in Medellín and
Sanchez-Llamas? First, a high hurdle exists to concluding that a treaty is selfexecuting. Only when the text of the treaty provides a “clear and express
statement” that a provision is to be self-executing can the courts interpret it as
such.132 And while the Chief Justice never mentioned a “presumption” against
self-execution, the very use of a “clear statement” requirement implies that
functionally a presumption does exist.133 Second, Medellín is significant
because ICJ judgments—at least with respect to some seventy treaties to which
the United States is party—will likely never be automatically enforceable in
U.S. courts.134 This is significant for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is that it upholds separation of powers by reserving U.S. policy on the
effect of ICJ decisions to the political branches, not the judiciary. Medellín also
upholds separation of powers principles in the context of the treaty power
because it gives the judiciary virtually no wiggle room to conclude that a treaty
is self-executing unless the President and Senate make it clear. Third,
128

Id. at 515.
Id. at 523.
130 Id. at 523–27.
131 Id. at 527–32.
132 Id. at 517 (“Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with state procedural rules, one would expect the
ratifying parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give those judgments domestic
effect, if they had so intended.”); see also id. at 546–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority
opinion to require a “clear statement” in the text of the treaty to find that a provision is self-executing).
133 Id. at 506 n.3 (majority opinion).
134 Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority opinion to require Congress to enact
specific legislation before ICJ judgments against the United States become enforceable in U.S. Courts); see
also id. (“Approximately 70 U.S. treaties now in force contain obligations comparable to those in the Optional
Protocol for submission of treaty-based disputes to the ICJ.” (internal citations omitted)).
129
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Roberts’s opinion reinforces federalism. Treaties often override state
legislation, and of course, under the Supremacy Clause, can constitutionally do
so.135 But by requiring a treaty’s language to give a clear statement that its
provisions are self-executing, Congress and the President—the political
branches of government—are the ones to decide when to preempt state laws in
matters generally reserved to the states.136 Finally, both Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellín reflect Chief Justice Roberts’ dualist view of international law. This
will be discussed in more depth in Part II.
D. The Scope of the Treaty Power
Arguably the most contentious international law issue in the United States
is the scope of the treaty power. The question is this: can Congress and the
President do by treaty what they otherwise could not do under Article I, § 8?137
Since 1920, the answer to this loaded question seems to have been yes. In
Missouri v. Holland, Justice Holmes famously remarked that “[if] the treaty is
valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I,
§ 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government.”138 Missouri v. Holland involved the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of July 3, 1918, a statute passed by Congress to implement a 1916 treaty
entered into between the United States and Great Britain to protect several
species of migratory birds that were in danger of becoming extinct.139 Missouri
argued that the Migratory Bird Act was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment.140 This was particularly true, argued Missouri, considering that a
district court had just held that a statute of Congress that was passed prior to
the treaty and attempted to accomplish the same result as the Migratory Bird
135 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. But see discussion infra Part I.D (discussing the scope of the treaty power
under the Constitution).
136 See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1661 (2011) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure Congress does
not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.”
(quoting Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion))).
137 There are actually two constitutional questions that fall under the broader question. This first is
whether there are limits to the treaty power itself. In other words, what is a “treaty?” Are only certain matters
the proper subjects of a constitutional treaty? Justice Thomas addressed this issue in his concurring opinion in
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). See infra note 165 and accompanying text. The second question
is whether the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to implement via statute non-self-executing
treaties that would otherwise violate Article I, § 8. Justice Holmes easily concluded that the answer to this
question was yes. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, disagrees. See
infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
138 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
139 Id. at 430–31.
140 Id. at 430.
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Treaty Act was held to be unconstitutional.141 In essence, Missouri argued that
the Constitution limited Congress’s power to ratify treaties just as it limited
Congress’s authority to pass laws.
Justice Holmes held that while there may be some limits to the treaty
power, such limits cannot be determined strictly by the Constitution. Rather,
limits on the treaty power, if any, should be determined based on whether the
subject of legislation was one requiring “national action” and involving the
“sharpest exigency,” as well as considering “what this country has become” in
deciding what powers it needs.142 The only apparent constitutional limit on the
treaty power was whether Congress’s implementing legislation “contravene[d]
any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.”143 Finding no such
“prohibitory words,” Justice Holmes concluded:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.
It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of
another power . . . . We see nothing in the Constitution that compels
the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the
protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.144

Thus, Missouri v. Holland has come to stand “for the proposition that the
Tenth Amendment has no bearing on Congress’s ability to legislate in
furtherance of the Treaty Power in Article II, § 2 of the Constitution.”145
For the first time in years,146 the Court had an opportunity to address the
issue in Bond v. United States.147 Indeed, the Third Circuit practically begged
the Court to provide guidance and clarification on this critical issue.148 Bond
141

Id. at 432.
Id. at 433–34.
143 Id. at 433.
144 Id. at 435.
145 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013), rev’d,
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
146 The issue was tangentially addressed in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957), which held generally
that treaties cannot contravene specific constitutional provisions but also upheld Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920).
147 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). This was the second time the case reached the Court. In
the first case, the Court held that federalism and the Tenth Amendment provide a litigant who otherwise has
standing a basis to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2365 (2011).
148 Bond, 681 F.3d at 170 (“I hope that the Supreme Court will soon flesh out ‘[t]he most important
sentence in the most important case about the constitutional law of foreign affairs,’ Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2005), and, doing so, clarify (indeed
curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws that intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the
Convention contemplated their inclusion in it.”).
142
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involved the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998,149 a
statute passed by Congress to carry out the obligations of the United States
under the Convention on Chemical Weapons.150 The Act prohibits any person
“knowingly . . . to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use,
any chemical weapon.”151 “Chemical weapon” is defined as a “toxic
chemical,”152 which is defined in relevant part as “any chemical which through
its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation
or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such
chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and
regardless of [where] they are produced . . . .”153 The Act exempts use of toxic
chemicals for certain peaceful purposes.154
The facts of the case are quite heartrending. After Bond found out that her
husband had impregnated her best friend, Bond stole an arsenic-based
compound from her employer and purchased another toxic chemical
commonly used for cleaning lab equipment.155 Intending to harm, but
apparently not kill, her friend-turned-nemesis, Bond traveled to the other
woman’s “home on at least 24 occasions and spread the chemicals on [her] car
door, mailbox, and door knob.”156 Only one time, however, was Bond able to
injure her new adversary. On this occasion, the woman suffered a minor burn
that was treated with water.157 Eventually, Bond was caught, and in addition to
being charged with mail theft, she was also charged with violating the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.158
A straightforward, textual application of the facts to the statute indicates
that Mrs. Bond violated the Act. She “knowingly” “used” a “chemical
weapon” for a non-peaceful purpose. She also knowingly possessed and
acquired a chemical weapon for a non-peaceful purpose. Seems

149

18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998).
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Sept. 3, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
151 18 U.S. C. § 229(a)(1).
152 Id. § 229F(1)(A).
153 Id. § 229F(8)(A).
154 Id. § 229F(7).
155 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
150
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straightforward, right?159 Bond is guilty. Not to Chief Justice Roberts (and five
other members of the Court). Relying on the principles of constitutional
avoidance160 and federalism, Chief Justice Roberts held that Bond’s conduct
did not fall within § 229(a): “The problem with [the government’s]
interpretation is that it would dramatically intrude upon traditional state
criminal jurisdiction, and we avoid reading statutes to have such reach in the
absence of a clear indication that they do.”161 Thus, the Court found
ambiguity—not in the text of the statute—but
from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given
the term—“chemical weapon”—being defined; the deeply serious
consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of
any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the
statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism.162

Relying on this alleged ambiguity and the lack of any “clear indication”
from Congress, the Court used the “background principle” of federalism to
conclude that the Act did not reach Bond’s conduct.163
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito wrote concurring opinions, all of which
disagreed that the Act did not cover Bond’s conduct.164 Justice Thomas wrote
primarily to articulate the original meaning of the treaty power. He argued that
the power to make treaties is confined “to arrang[ing] intercourse with other
nations, but not to regulate purely domestic affairs.”165 Justice Scalia joined
Justice Thomas’s opinion in full but wrote separately to chastise the Chief
Justice for rewriting the text of the statute simply “to leave in place an illconsidered ipse dixit [Missouri v. Holland] that enables the fundamental
159 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013), rev’d,
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (“Bond’s behavior ‘clearly constituted unlawful possession and use of a chemical
weapon under § 229.’” (quoting United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2009))); Bond, 134 S. Ct. at
2094 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“As sweeping and unsettling as the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998 may be, it is clear beyond doubt that it covers what Bond did.”).
160 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087–88 (“[I]t is a ‘well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of
this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other
ground upon which to dispose of the case.’” (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984)
(per curiam))).
161 Id. at 2088 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
162 Id. at 2090.
163 Id. at 2090–91.
164 Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas’s opinion in full and joined part of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Justice
Alito concluded in his short opinion: “Section 229 cannot be regarded as necessary and proper to carry into
execution the treaty power, and accordingly it lies outside Congress’ reach unless supported by some other
power enumerated in the Constitution.” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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constitutional principle of limited federal powers to be set aside by the
President and Senate’s exercise of the treaty power.”166 Justice Scalia further
argued that the text and structure of the Constitution afford Congress no power
independent of Article I, § 8 to carry treaties into execution.167 Justice Scalia
also rebuked Chief Justice Roberts for turning to canons of statutory
construction when the text of the statute, in this case the definition of
“chemical weapon,” was unambiguous:
Who in the world would have thought that a definition is inoperative
if it contradicts ordinary meaning? When this statute was enacted,
there was not yet a “Bond presumption” to that effect—though
presumably Congress will have to take account of the Bond
presumption in the future, perhaps by adding at the end of all its
definitions that depart from ordinary connotation “and we really
mean it.”168

Where does this leave constitutional law with respect to the treaty power?
In largely the same place it has been for almost a hundred years. All we know
is that three Justices stand poised to confine the treaty power to a foreign
relations subject matter restriction and normal constitutional limits—including
the Tenth Amendment. But, until another case presents itself to the Court,
lower courts will likely continue to feel constrained by the ipse dixit of
Holland. And if the Senate continues its policy of not ratifying major human
rights treaties,169 and when it does ratify them of expressly making them nonself-executing,170 it is unlikely that a justiciable case will present itself anytime
soon. As for the Chief Justice, Bond indicates his marked intention to favor
precedent, defer to the political branches, and avoid broad, constitutional
rulings—despite what the Constitution might require. These issues will be
discussed in greater detail in Part II.

166

Id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2098–2102.
168 Id. at 2097.
169 For example, the Senate has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Convention on
the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2,
1990).
170 E.g., U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, S. REP. NO. 102-23 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. CCPR RDUs].
167
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E. International Law as Part of Common Law, as Part of Federal Common
Law, as Part of the U.S. Constitution?
Is international law part of U.S. law? In traditional thought, international
law has three primary sources of law,171 although two are predominant: treaties
and customary law. Under the U.S. Constitution, only treaties are given the
esteemed status as “Supreme Law of the Land”;172 the un-codified law of
nations, or customary law, is not mentioned in the Supremacy Clause. Instead,
customary international law is mentioned only in Article I, § 8 where Congress
is authorized to define and punish offences in violation of the “law of
nations.”173 Despite the lack of textual authority for applying the law of
nations, the Supreme Court routinely applied customary international law in
cases before it since the early days of the republic.174 Indeed, in 1900 in The
Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court famously declared that “[i]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”175
In what, then, did the Supreme Court base its authority to apply
international law? The answer lies in the “general common law”:176 “[T]he
understanding that emerged after 1789 was that, in matters not closely tied to a
particular State and not governed by statutory law, federal and state courts
applied a ‘general’ common law that was neither state law nor federal law, but

171 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). Article 38 lists a third primary source, general principles and equity. Id.
172 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1984) (“But neither the constitutional grants to Congress and the federal courts,
nor any act of Congress, declared or necessarily implied that the law of nations was incorporated as selfexecuting domestic law.”).
174 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Jecker Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. 110
(1856); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. 38, 50 (1852); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 422–26 (1853); Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) (“Till such an act be passed,
the Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land.”); M’Donough v. Dannery, 3 U.S.
188, 197 (1796); Edwin M. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 33 (1952).
175 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
176 International law is part of the common law, so if common law is part of federal law, federal courts
have authority to adjudicate claims involving the law of nations. Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B.
1764) (Mansfield, J.); see also Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 161 (1795) (Iredell, J.) (noting that the
defendant’s action was “palpabl[y] a violation of our own law (I mean the common law, of which the law of
nations is a part, as it subsisted ether before the act of Congress on the subject, or since that has provide a
particular manner of enforcing it)”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
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rather part of common adjudicatory enterprise.”177 This understanding was the
basis for Justice Story’s famous decision in Swift v. Tyson,178 where he held
that the Judiciary Act179 did not require federal courts to follow state rules of
decision in nonlocal matters like the law merchant, which was part of the law
of nations.180 On the contrary, federal courts were permitted to express their
own opinion on what the general common law was and apply that law in cases
before them.181
As all first-year law students know, the Supreme Court overruled Swift in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which famously held that
[t]here is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State whether they be local in their nature or “general,”
be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.182
Accordingly, a straightforward reading of Erie signaled the end of
international law as “part” of federal law, especially because Swift involved the
law merchant, which was part of international law.183 Although the issue lay
dormant for some time,184 the Supreme Court provided some clarity in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. In Sabbatino, the Court held that the “Act of
State Doctrine” prohibited the Court from entering judgment against a foreign
sovereign.185 Importantly, the Court noted that Erie could not possibly have
been intended to apply to the Act of State Doctrine: “we are constrained to
177 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 27 (David L. Sloss et
al. eds., 2011).
178 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
179 The Judiciary Act instructed federal courts “[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision, in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20.
180 Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19.
181 Id.
182 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
183 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Erie affected the status
of the law of nations in federal courts not merely by the implication of its holding but quite directly, since the
question decided in Swift turned on the ‘law merchant,’ then a subset of the law of nations.”).
184 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948) (“Whether an avowed refusal to accept a
well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal
question we need not consider, for neither is present here.”).
185 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

WALTON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS

2/15/2016 9:41 AM

419

make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in
ordering our relationships with other members of the international community
must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”186 Years later, the
Second Circuit in Filártiga did not even discuss Erie in holding that the law of
nations was part of federal common law. Instead, the Court cited Sabbatino
and several pre-Erie cases for its conclusion that “federal jurisdiction over
cases involving [customary] international law is clear.”187
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, just
before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court.188 According to the majority,
written by Justice Souter, customary international law remained as one of the
few living bodies of federal common law post-Erie.189 Instead of serving as a
bar to federal courts making rules of decision under international law, Erie
merely counseled “for judicial caution when considering the kinds of
individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the [Alien
Tort Statute].”190 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist,
disagreed. According to Justice Scalia, Erie, combined with the now
predominate Holmesian view that judges do not discover the common law but
consciously make it, precluded federal courts from “creat[ing] causes of action
for the enforcement of international-law-based norms.”191 Justice Scalia argued
that international law is not one of the surviving “limited enclaves”192 of
federal common law post-Erie because Congress has not authorized the courts
lawmaking power in this area, a necessary condition precedent under Erie for
the federal courts to exercise substantive lawmaking power.193
Chief Justice Roberts has not addressed the issue. While Kiobel involved
the liability of corporations under international law, Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion did not address that issue and therefore did not discuss the status of

186

Id. at 425.
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
188 But see Eric Engle, Alvarez-Machain v. United States and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 149, 158 (2005) (“The Sosa Court
addressed this issue, the role of international law in the common law, only indirectly in its discussion of
federal common law post-Erie. However, due to the confusion Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins generated, that issue
persists and was in no way settled or even directly addressed by the Sosa court.”).
189 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
190 Id. at 725–26.
191 Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 729 (majority opinion).
193 Id. at 741–42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187
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international law as federal common law.194 Thus, the status of customary
international law as part of the federal common law stands on the thin floor of
Sosa, but without much foundation. Does Sosa’s holding apply beyond the
human rights context? Is international law part of federal common law only as
international law was understood at the time of the founding? Sosa says no,195
but the issue is far from settled.196 These questions and more are left open to be
answered by Chief Justice Roberts and his Court at a later date. But the
question arises, why did Chief Justice Roberts in Kiobel avoid the issue of
corporate liability under international law and the broader issue of whether
customary international law is automatically incorporated into justiciable
federal law? The answer lies in the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
At the beginning of the Article it was posited that Chief Justice Roberts is a
prudentialist.197 In analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s prudentialism, one
commentator found him to be “a Chief Justice who takes limits on judicial
authority seriously, who appreciates the need to respect the tasks and authority
of other institutions of government, and whose general watchwords as a judge
are modesty and humility.”198 Similarly, former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez summarized the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy in four
principles: judicial avoidance, judicial deference, narrow construction, and
clarity.199
To determine whether this hypothesis is correct, this Part analyzes the cases
discussed to see what trends emerge. At least four observations are noteworthy.
First, the cases discussed in Part I indicate Chief Justice Roberts’s marked
commitment to defer to the political branches. By strengthening and clarifying
the presumption against extraterritoriality, restoring the ATS to its likely
original meaning, and reaffirming that a treaty’s text must indicate that it is
self-executing, the Supreme Court has ensured that Congress and the President,
not the Courts, will determine U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, in Bond the
194 See supra Part I.B. Note, however, that Kiobel did state that Sosa “held that federal courts may
‘recognize private claims [for such violations] under federal common law.’” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).
195 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Sosa essentially leads
today’s judges to ask: Who are today’s pirates?”).
196 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
197 Breen, supra note 6; see also supra Part I.
198 Breen, supra note 6, at 130.
199 Gonzales, supra note 8, at 668.
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Chief Justice strained the plain meaning of the text to ensure a result that did
not curtail the political branches’ discretion in using treaties as they see fit.
Second, the cases indicate Chief Justice Roberts’s deep respect for
separation of powers. By clarifying the presumption against extraterritoriality,
Congress will have a clear backdrop against which it can legislate. And less
ambiguity in the meaning and application of the presumption seriously curtails
the ability of federal judges from using it as a convenient tool to accomplish
their own policy goals. The same applies to the doctrine of self-executing
treaties. By holding that the primary factor to determining whether a treaty is
self-executing is the treaty’s text, Chief Justice Roberts gave the Senate a clear
opportunity to express its will when ratifying treaties and less room for the
courts to pick and choose which treaties they want to enforce. Indeed, Chief
Justice Roberts’s primary point of dispute with the dissent’s approach in
Medellín was that it allowed the judiciary to usurp the constitutionallydesignated role of the political branches in treaty practice through its
“multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis that would ‘jettiso[n] relative
predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors.’”200
Medellín’s second holding—that the President’s memorandum directing the
states to enforce Avena was an unconstitutional exercise of the lawmaking
power—further shows commitment to separation of powers.201 If the
President’s memorandum was in fact binding “law,” it must have been made
consistent with the Constitution, and the Constitution vests Congress, not the
President, with the authority to make laws. Congress had not passed a law
delegating this authority to the President, and therefore the President was
unconstitutionally attempting to make law.202 Former Attorney General
Alberto Gonzalez characterized the Chief Justice’s philosophy regarding
separation of powers as to “[d]efer to the separate political branches and
elected officials so long as they operate within constitutional boundaries.”203 In
other words, defer unless one branch is clearly violating separation of powers.
This is exactly what Chief Justice Roberts did in Medellín.
Kiobel’s effect on international human rights litigation also lends support to
this proposition. International human rights litigation involves creating causes
200 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)).
201 Id. at 526–27.
202 Id.
203 Gonzalez, supra note 8, at 693.
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of action, fashioning remedies, and defining international law. It also seriously
implicates U.S. foreign policy as U.S. courts sit in judgment on foreign
governments’ practices. All of these issues, at least in the U.S. constitutional
system, are questions for Congress. Yet the scope of international human rights
litigation under the ATS was initiated and shaped by the judiciary. Kiobel
presented an opportunity for Chief Justice Roberts to restore control over the
scope and nature of international human rights litigation to Congress. Acting
within settled legal precedent, Chief Justice Roberts took that opportunity by
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to causes of action brought
under the ATS.
Third, the cases analyzed demonstrate a staunch commitment to federalism.
Indeed, the entire basis behind Bond’s holding was federalism, and Medellín
and Sanchez-Llamas firmly support federalism as well. Treaties often override
state law. If Article 94 of the U.N. Charter were self-executing, as Justice
Breyer claimed, an ICJ judgment would have required Texas to cast aside a
foundational rule of criminal procedure—an issue reserved to the states under
the Constitution. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts held that the treaty was not
self-executing and required the Senate to make clear its intention to make a
treaty self-executing in the text of the treaty. Accordingly, Chief Justice
Roberts upheld federalism and left the decision to preempt state law to elected
officials in Congress.204 Even Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment,
noted that federalism supported the Chief Justice’s opinion.205
Fourth, the cases indicate the Chief Justice’s commitment to a dualist
perspective of international law. Dualism maintains that “[i]nternational [l]aw
and municipal law are two quite different spheres of legal action, and
theoretically there should be no point of conflict between them. Municipal law
addresses itself to the subjects of sovereigns, international law to the
sovereigns themselves.”206 Moreover, to a dualist, a municipal law that violates
international law does not render the municipal law void; “it merely follows
that the sovereign has violated international law.”207 Kiobel unambiguously
demonstrates a dualist perspective. Chief Justice Roberts interpreted the ATS
204 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 513–14 (“The pertinent international agreements, therefore, do not provide for
implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts, and ‘where a treaty does not
provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the
States through lawmaking of their own.’” (quoting Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006))).
205 Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
206 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, RICHARD F. SCOTT & NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 21–22 (6th ed. 2010).
207 Id.
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consistently with U.S. rules of statutory construction, whereas Justice Breyer,
in dissent, would have construed the ATS to be “consistent with international
law and foreign practice.”208 More than Kiobel, Medellín flatly rejects the
notion that international law preempts municipal law in domestic affairs. In
Medellín, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that although Avena
undoubtedly constituted an “international law obligation” of the United
States,209 this fact had no bearing on whether it was binding domestic law
enforceable in U.S. courts. On the contrary, whether Avena bound “the
subjects” of the United States was governed by U.S. law, and under U.S. law
non-self-executing treaties are not automatically enforceable in domestic
courts. Further, the Chief Justice was emphatic in Sanchez-Llamas that the
Supreme Court of the United States—not the ICJ—has final say over
determining the meaning of a treaty that is to be given effect as U.S. federal
law.210 This is quintessential dualism.
Judicial deference, separation of powers, federalism, preserving U.S.
sovereignty—sounds a lot like a conservative, not a prudentialist, justice.
What, then, distinguishes the prudentialist judicial philosophy from the
conservative judicial philosophy? Undoubtedly, the two have significant
overlap. Both are committed to confining the judiciary to its proper, but
narrow, role under the Constitution. Both are committed to separation of
powers and federalism. And both view international law as law that governs
relations between States and that is not to be enforced by federal courts absent
clear direction from Congress.211 But the prudentialist judicial philosophy,
unlike the conservative judicial philosophy, is also pragmatic when thinking
about these first principles. Instead of ruling blindly on the case before him, a
prudentialist justice will consider the practical effects of the holding of the
case—including the effects on other public and private institutions’ ability to
carry out their legitimate functions in American democracy; the impact of the
decision on the public’s perception of the Court;212 ensuring that the Court is
not the final arbiter of contentious political issues; and the ability to build
208

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1675 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504.
210 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006).
211 E.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“International-law norms that have not been incorporated into domestic U.S. law by the
political branches are not judicially enforceable limits on the President’s authority under the AUMF. This
separate opinion explains at great length my reasons for reaching that conclusion.”).
212 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The legitimacy of this
Court ultimately rests ‘upon the respect accorded to its judgments.’” (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
209
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consensus across political lines. Taking into account practical effects “does not
mean that a prudentialist judge will be unlikely to subject other institutions to
constitutional standards; it means only that he or she will do so in a way that
respects the place that those institutions themselves hold in the American
historical and constitutional scheme.”213
For the conservative, legislatures, not judges, consider practical effects.214
A conservative justice simply rules based on the meaning of the text of the law
as it was understood by those who passed it. If the law compels a result that,
for example, ends up making the executive’s job more difficult, so be it.215
Indeed, on some level the entire purpose of the Constitution was to make it
difficult for the government to do anything.216 But to a prudentialist, the
practical effects of a particular ruling are important considerations in deciding
how to rule in a particular case.217 If the practical effects of a case will
undermine the prudentialist’s “first principles”218—like by ending debate on a
contentious political issue,219 or unnecessarily hamstringing other institutions
213

Breen, supra note 6, at 87.
Consider the following statement made by Justice Kennedy, certainly not the Court’s most
conservative Justice:
214

It is not novel or new for justices to be concerned that they are making so many decisions that
affect a democracy. And we think a responsible, efficient, responsive legislative and executive
branch in the political system will alleviate some of that pressure. We routinely decide cases
involving federal statutes, and we say, “Well, if this is wrong, the Congress will fix it.” But then
we hear that Congress can’t pass the bill one way or the other, that there’s gridlock. And some
people say, “Well that should affect the way we interpret the statutes.” That seems to me a wrong
proposition. We have to assume that we have three fully functioning branches of the government,
that are committed to proceed in good faith and with good will toward one another to resolve the
problems of this republic.
Notable & Quotable: Anthony Kennedy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/notablequotable-anthony-kennedy-1427238816.
215 E.g., NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
216 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (noting that when framing a government, it is necessary
to oblige the government to control itself).
217 Breen, supra note 6, at 86.
218 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (stating that the President’s need for flexibility in foreign
policy “do[es] not allow us to set aside first principles”); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct.
2076, 2113 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The first principles in [constitutional foreign policy] are firmly
established.”).
219 E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the constitutionality of
the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act by finding that it was a tax, not a regulation of commerce);
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015) (saving the Affordable Care Act’s subsidy program by ruling
that the phrase, “exchange established by the State,” includes exchanges created by the federal government);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Understand well what this
dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to
include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest
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of government220—the prudentialist will find a way to craft the opinion
consistent with his first principles, despite the fact that a “formal” reading of
the law compels a different result. Moreover, a prudentialist, unlike a
conservative, will generally avoid broad rulings—even if the law mandates a
broad ruling. To the prudentialist, avoiding broad rulings is a practical way to
ensure that the judiciary plays only a small role in American democracy—
certainly a first principle of prudentialist judicial philosophy. Thus, although
similar, prudentialist and conservative judicial philosophies are distinct.
Bond illustrates this distinction well. In Bond, the Chief Justice ignored the
plain meaning of the text to avoid having to make a broad-sweeping
pronouncement of constitutional law that would have significant effects on the
President and Congress’s ability to conduct foreign policy through the treaty
power. Instead of a broad constitutional ruling that would overturn precedent
(even if that precedent does not comport with the Constitution), the Chief
Justice issued a narrow ruling that had little impact beyond the case itself.221
For the conservative Justices—Thomas, Scalia, and Alito—the case was
simple. The meaning of the Chemical Weapons Implementation Act was clear,
and the function of judges is to apply the plain meaning of the text to the case
before them. This analysis resulted in a conviction under the Chemical
Weapons Act, and therefore required the Court to address the constitutional
issue based on the original meaning of the Constitution, regardless of what
practical barriers the ruling might impose on the political branches and despite
the fact that precedent must be overruled. For the conservatives, applying the
plain meaning of the text of statutes and the original meaning of the
Constitution blindly is what was “prudent” because that is what the
Constitution required. Indeed, construing statutes “creatively” (i.e., ignoring
the plain meaning of the text) is legislating, not judging.222 Legislatures vote
on the text of a statute, not its purposes, and the judiciary’s job is to say what
the law—the text of a statute—is.223 Thus, to the conservative Justices,
creatively construing the Chemical Weapons Implementation Act in the name

with the people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold
commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt
about the answer.”).
220 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
221 But cf. id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., concurring).
222 George F. Will, On Obamcare, John Roberts Helped Overthrow the Constitution, WASH. POST (June
25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-roberts-helps-overthrow-the-constitution/2015/06/
25/47d9ffde-1b67-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html.
223 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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of judicial deference224 was actually “judicial dereliction”225 and undermined
separation of powers.
The analysis for the prudentialist in Bond was different. Because the scope
of international law is vastly expanding, the treaty power has become an
important tool for the President and Congress to carry out foreign policy. The
President and Congress therefore purportedly need the ability to use treaties
flexibly to carry out foreign policy and provide leadership in the international
arena. Accordingly, rather than making a broad ruling striking down the Act as
unconstitutional, the prudentialist would (and indeed did) find a way to issue a
narrow ruling—all the while trying to uphold the rest of the prudentialist’s
judicial philosophy. This is exactly what Chief Justice Roberts tried to
accomplish in Bond. Chief Justice Roberts used the principle of federalism to
find the statute ambiguous and then rule modestly against the government’s
construction of the Act. Construing the statute in this fashion resulted in no
conviction and, therefore, rendered the constitutional issue moot. Not only did
the Chief Justice afford the political branches flexibility in foreign affairs,
reinforce the importance of federalism, and issue a narrow ruling, but the Chief
Justice also attracted the Court’s liberal wing to his opinion. Building
consensus, if possible, is critical to a prudentialist. Moreover, the Chief
Justice’s opinion still arguably reigned in an overreaching federal government,
effectively signaling to the political branches that treaties that intrude upon
purely local matters will not be tolerated.
Beyond desiring to afford the political branches sufficient flexibility, Chief
Justice Roberts also likely ruled the way he did in Bond because Congress and
the President have, at least to some extent, largely policed themselves with
respect to the treaty power. While the President and Congress certainly have
the potential to completely overstep their constitutional bounds if the treaty
power is not confined to its original meaning, the fact is that thus far, they have
not used the treaty power to completely run roughshod over the Tenth

224

See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“In a democracy, the power to make the law rests
with those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined—‘to say what the law is.’ Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect the role
of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.”).
225 Will, supra note 222.
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Amendment. Even Justice Scalia admitted that the harm, although great, is
only a potential harm.226
Consider human rights treaties. While great on paper, the major human
rights treaties have the potential to cut the legs right off of federalism.227
Indeed, human rights treaties “touch on almost every aspect of domestic civil,
political, and cultural life.”228 If there was one treaty area where the political
branches could overstep constitutional bounds of federalism, it would be
through human rights treaties. So what have the political branches done with
these treaties? In short, nothing. The political branches have refused to ratify
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,229 the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,230 and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.231 And the three
major human rights treaties the United States has ratified, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,232 the
Convention Against Torture,233 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, are explicitly non-self-executing.234 Thus, to the prudentialist,
it would be improper to make a broad ruling and unnecessarily hamstring the
political branches in carrying out their constitutionally assigned function of
conducting foreign affairs when they are already (to a certain extent)
complying with the Constitution.
Bond also demonstrates another key aspect of the prudentialist judicial
philosophy that somewhat differs from the conservative judicial philosophy:
226 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If that is true, then the
possibilities of what the Federal Government may accomplish, with the right treaty in hand, are endless and
hardly farfetched.” (emphasis added)).
227 For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States has not ratified,
covers many issues that implicate family law, an issue traditionally reserved to the states. See Convention on
the Rights of the Child, supra note 169.
228 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3.
229 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
230 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 169.
231 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
232 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Preamble, opened
for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
233 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26 1987).
234 U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. REP. NO. 103-29 (1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, S. REP. NO. 101-30 (1990); U.S. CCPR RDUs, supra note 170.
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gradualism and respect for tradition and precedent. Indeed, the very definition
of prudence implies distaste for abrupt change and hunger for only “careful,
gradual reform.”235 In Bond, the Chief Justice upheld federalism and still
creatively avoided having to address a major constitutional issue and the
question of whether to overrule a precedent decided almost a hundred years
ago236 and affirmed in the 1950s.237 Because the Chief Justice did not believe
any first principles were at stake, prudence counseled that the question was
better left for another day. While a conservative justice also respects precedent,
a conservative’s fidelity is first and foremost to the original meaning of the
Constitution. If a previous case clearly contradicts the original meaning of the
Constitution and undermines the constitutional structure, a conservative will
not hesitate to overrule the case and reign in an overreaching executive or
legislature. Justice Scalia indirectly explained this distinction in his concurring
opinion in Bond:
We have here a supposedly “narrow” opinion which, in order to be
“narrow,” sets forth interpretive principles never before imagined that
will bedevil our jurisprudence (and proliferate litigation) for years to
come . . . . All this to leave in place an ill-considered ipse dixit
[Holland] that enables the fundamental constitutional principle of
limited federal powers to be set aside by the President and Senate’s
exercise of the treaty power. We should not have shirked our duty
and distorted the law to preserve that assertion; we should have
welcomed and eagerly grasped the opportunity—nay, the
obligation—to consider and repudiate it.238

For Chief Justice Roberts, however, Bond was an “unusual” case, which
warranted “limited analysis.”239 In other words, rarely has the federal
government used a treaty in a manner that so clearly violates the Constitution.
This rarity required judicial restraint, especially considering that the Chemical
Weapons Treaty is undoubtedly a proper subject for a treaty under the original
meaning of the Constitution and that establishing a neutral, principled rule to
govern the treaty power is not necessarily an easy task.240 Prudence, therefore,
235

Breen, supra note 6, at 87.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
237 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
238 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring).
239 See id. at 2093 (majority opinion).
240 Id. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I acknowledge that the distinction between matters of
international intercourse and matters of purely domestic regulation may not be obvious in all cases.”); see also
Mark Strasser, International Covenant as Bond: On Federalism and Congress’s Ability to Promote National
Interests via the Treaty Power, 84 MISS. L.J. 309, 347–48 (2015).
236
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counseled avoiding the issue in favor of allowing it to continue to be refined in
the crucible of separation of powers, federalism, and democracy.241
Kiobel also demonstrates the gradualist tendency of prudentialism.
Customary international law has seemingly been accepted as part of federal
common law since the founding. While Erie changed the analysis, the issue is
hardly settled.242 The D.C. Circuit is sharply divided on the question,243 and the
extent to which international law is automatically incorporated into federal law
has immense repercussions for the constitutional system of the United States.
Kiobel presented the opportunity for Chief Justice Roberts to express his views
on the subject, although whether he would have commanded a majority
opinion is questionable considering Justice Kennedy voted in the majority in
Sosa. Instead of attacking this issue, the Chief Justice found another way to
rule in Kiobel that avoided the question and still returned the authority over
international human rights litigation to Congress.
Remember that in Kiobel the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to
decide whether the law of nations recognized corporate liability for human
rights abuses.244 To answer that question, of course, the Court would again
have had to confront whether international law is part of federal common law.
This question was implicitly answered affirmatively by a liberal majority in
Sosa before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court.245 Instead of addressing
this issue again, however, the Court—after oral arguments—ordered
supplemental briefing to address “under what circumstances courts may
recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”246 This question was not addressed by Sosa. Sosa simply
assumed that the ATS did allow U.S. federal courts to entertain causes of
action that occurred outside the United States.247 Thus, with a narrow ruling
based on the presumption against extraterritoriality, Chief Justice Roberts did

241 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“It has not been necessary over the past 225 years to definitively resolve a dispute between Congress and the
President over the recognition power. Perhaps we could have waited another 225 years.”).
242 See supra Part I.E.
243 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
244 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133. S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
245 See supra Part I.E.
246 Id.; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
247 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer J.,
concurring) (“Not surprisingly, both before and after Sosa, courts have consistently rejected the notion that the
ATS is categorically barred from extraterritorial application.”).
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not overrule Sosa, a very recent and high-profile case, yet still largely
corrected Sosa’s constitutional error of allowing the courts to formulate U.S.
policy with respect to international human rights litigation.248 This strategy
allowed the Chief Justice to respect precedent yet not sacrifice first principles
of separation of powers and judicial deference.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts is a prudentialist. This judicial philosophy of modesty
and humility is exemplified in just a sampling of international law-related
cases in which Chief Justice Roberts penned majority opinions. The
presumption against extraterritoriality is now a clear legal standard Congress
can use to ensure that its will, and not an unelected judge’s will, is carried out
in the courts. Whether the United States is a proper forum for litigating
international human rights cases will be determined by the democratic process.
The Senate is now in a stronger position to ensure that it will be the institution
to decide whether to allow the courts a role in foreign affairs through the
enforcement of treaties against the political branches. The limits to the treaty
power, if any, remain hidden. Whether international law is part of federal
common law is left to be litigated in all the federal courts on an issue-by-issue
basis.
While these results appear fairly “conservative” in nature, Part II
demonstrated that the prudential and conservative judicial philosophies are
different. The core distinction is the prudentialist’s elevation of judicial
deference, narrow rulings, and gradualism above the original meaning of the
text. In other words, the prudentialist is first and foremost committed to
confining the judicial branch to a minor role in American democracy. This is
no doubt a noble goal, and it certainly seems to be Chief Justice Roberts’s
goal. For far too long has the Court usurped the role of the people, the states,
and the political branches by constitutionalizing issues that in fact have no
basis in the Constitution.249 When the Court does this, it destroys the
democratic process by taking any debate on the issue away from public life,
state legislatures, and Congress, where the people’s voices can be heard, to the
federal courts, where they cannot. Accordingly, adhering to a judicial
248 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Deny extraterritorial
application [to the ATS], and the statute would be superfluous . . . .”).
249 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If you are
among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all
means celebrate today’s decision . . . . But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”).
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philosophy that seeks to narrow the role of the judiciary is vital to the proper
functioning of our democratic system and correcting the serious flaw in the
current reign of judicial supremacy.250
But, contrary to what Chief Justice Roberts may believe, confining the
judiciary to a narrower role than the Constitution mandates is also dangerous.
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court sits atop an independent, co-equal
branch of government that is tasked with a critical function in our system of
separation of powers and checks and balances. To protect liberty, including
democracy, each branch must carry out its assigned function, that is, “ambition
must counteract ambition.”251 So the question arises, what does the
Constitution require of an Article III judge? While this question is well beyond
the scope of this Article, two points are certain: the judiciary has merely
“judgment,” not “force []or will”;252 and the judicial function must be separate
from the legislative and executive functions.253 As the esteemed Montesquieu,
on whom the Founders greatly relied in shaping the Constitution, remarked:
[T]here is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for
the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.254

Undoubtedly, then, any legitimate judicial philosophy desiring to uphold
democracy and claiming adherence to the Constitution must seek to exercise
only “judgment” and to separate completely the judicial function from the
legislative and executive functions. So does Chief Justice Robert’s
prudentialism accomplish these two goals? While the cases analyzed in Part I
indicate that this answer is generally yes, Bond demonstrates that prudentialism
can sometimes lead the Chief Justice to exercise his “will” instead of
“judgment” (by ignoring the plain meaning of the text) and join the judicial
power to the legislative power (again, by ignoring the plain meaning of the

250 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
251 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison).
252 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
253 See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; infra note 254.
254 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI 182 (Thomas
Nugent, trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1900) (1748); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
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text).255 In other words, the Chief Justice’s commitment to judicial deference
and narrow rulings can easily become judicial enablement. And judicial
enablement can lead to the political branches (or the liberal wing of the Court)
trampling the Constitution and democracy.256 Ironic for a judicial philosophy
that is founded on separation of powers, judicial deference, and democracy.

255 Will, supra note 222 (“What Roberts does by way of, to be polite, creative construing (Justice Antonin
Scalia, dissenting, calls it ‘somersaults of statutory interpretation’) is legislating, not judging.”); see also Bond
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
256 See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Wages of Crying Judicial Restraint, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
925 (2013); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Definition of Insanity: Jeb Bush Still Favors Appointing Judges
“with a proven record of judicial restraint,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/27/jeb-bush-still-favors-appointing-judges-with-aproven-record-of-judicial-restraint/.

